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Usage-based approaches typically draw on a relatively small set of cognitive processes,
such as categorization, analogy, and chunking to explain language structure and function.
The goal of this paper is to first review the extent to which the “cognitive commitment”
of usage-based theory has had success in explaining empirical findings across domains,
including language acquisition, processing, and typology. We then look at the overall
strengths and weaknesses of usage-based theory and highlight where there are signif-
icant debates. Finally, we draw special attention to a set of culturally generated structural
patterns that seem to lie beyond the explanation of core usage-based cognitive processes.
In this context we draw a distinction between cognition permitting language structure vs.
cognition entailing language structure. As well as addressing the need for greater clarity
on the mechanisms of generalizations and the fundamental units of grammar, we suggest
that integrating culturally generated structures within existing cognitive models of use will
generate tighter predictions about how language works.
Keywords: usage-based, language processing, language-acquisition, typology, cultural learning
“Don’t ask for the meaning; ask for the use” – Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations
Linguistic theory has a lot to explain. First, the structure of lan-
guage emerges over vastly different time scales: the split-second
processes of producing and comprehending speech; the years an
individual takes to construct their language; the centuries over
which languages evolve. Second, there is the sheer diversity of
forms languages take. Despite the rate at which languages are dis-
appearing, a person would have to walk less than 50 miles on
average to meet a new language if all they were equally distrib-
uted over the inhabitable world. Compare this with our closest
living evolutionary cousins. The odd cultural variation in hand-
shake in Chimpanzees is impressive but it does not really compete
with over 6000 ways of saying “hello” (Foley and Lahr, 2011).
Third, language is a complex adaptive system (Bybee, 2010). This
means the language people know changes and reorganizes itself in
response to multiple competing factors. The nested feedback loops
this sets up defy any simple input-output analysis, ratcheting up
the complexity further.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we give a
brief outline of the core cognitive processes that underpin the
usage-based approach. Second, we examine the extent to a usage-
based cognitive framework predicts empirical findings in language
acquisition, processing, and typology – domains that are not usu-
ally not brought together in this way. One criterion to judge the
strength of usage-based theory is to examine whether it has made
subtle predictions across a range of domains. Converging evidence
from separate domains that employ a vast range of methodologies
and occupy a wide range of positions on the theoretical spec-
trum would provide particularly strong support. Third, we briefly
discuss the philosophical implications of adopting a usage-based
approach before reflecting on what usage-based theory does well,
what it does less well, and where there are significant points of
disagreement pointing to new lines of research. Finally, we present
findings from the linguistic anthropological literature, looking at
ways in which culture may constrain linguistic structure. We sug-
gest a challenging new line of research will be to ground culturally
dependent structures within existing cognitive models of use.
THE USAGE-BASED APPROACH
Despite the daunting scope of linguistic phenomena begging an
explanation, usage-based theories of language representation have
a simple overarching approach. Whether the focus is on language
processing, acquisition, or change, knowledge of a language is
based in knowledge of actual usage and generalizations made over
usage events (Langacker, 1987, 1991; Croft, 1991; Givón, 1995;
Tomasello, 2003; Goldberg, 2006; Bybee, 2010). For usage-based
theories the complexity of language emerges not as a result of a
language-specific instinct but through the interaction of cognition
and use.
These broad assumptions are in contrast with those of the gen-
erativist and structural traditions who analyze language as a static
or synchronic system, self-contained, and autonomous from the
cognitive and social matrix of language use. The aim here is not to
detail the case against generativist universal grammar (plenty of
that criticism exists elsewhere, e.g., Tomasello, 2004; Christiansen
and Chater, 2008; Evans and Levinson, 2009; see Ambridge and
Lieven, 2011 for contrasting theoretical approaches to language
acquisition). Here we devote more space to the strengths and weak-
nesses of usage-based theory and point to where there might be
new theoretical ground to break. One thing is worth briefly stat-
ing here though. Much theoretical work in generativist linguistics
followed from the assumption that it was impossible for a child
to acquire the rules of their grammar with the tools of Behavior-
ism. Few developmental psychologists would disagree with this but
equally, after 50 years of research into the social-cognitive abil-
ities of children, few developmental psychologists would define
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the resources available to the child in merely Behaviorist terms.
The section on language acquisition and cultural use outlines the
nature of what some of these resources are – although it is a point
of debate whether one is convinced that these resources provide a
complete account of language acquisition.
The usage-based position is closely allied with that of Cognitive
Linguistics and Construction Grammar where the fundamental
linguistic unit is the construction: a meaningful symbolic assembly
used for the purpose of signally relevant communicative inten-
tions. Syntactic schemas, idioms, morphology, word classes, and
lexical items are all treated as constructions that vary along a con-
tinuum of specificity (Langacker,1987; Fillmore et al., 1988). If one
accepts the premise that language is like this, the developmental
implications are quite profound: if children can learn idiosyncratic
yet productive constructions (e.g., Her go to the ballet! My mother-
in-law ride a bike!), then why can they not learn the more canonical
ones in the same way? In the cognitive linguistic/construction
grammar approach, a grammar is more than a list of construc-
tions however. The organization and productivity of language is
understood as the result of analogies between the form and/or
meaning in a structured inventory of constructions. For exam-
ple, the phrases the taller they come the harder they fall, the more
the merrier, the older they get the cuter they ain’t are all variations
on an underlying theme or productive schema; the X-er the Y-er.
Moreover, there are no core/periphery, competence/performance
distinctions of generativist theory – it is constructions and use
all the way down (and up). This very brief characterization of
usage-based approaches gives a flavor of what usage-based theo-
rists think language is. We now turn to the cognitive processes that
are thought to generate linguistic structure.
USAGE-BASED PROCESSES
Bybee (2010), a key architect of usage-based theory, identifies
several cognitive processes that influence the use and develop-
ment of linguistic structure (i) categorization; identifying tokens
as an instances of a particular type (ii) chunking; the formation of
sequential units through repetition or practice (iii) rich memory;
the storage of detailed information from experience (iv) analogy;
mapping of an existing structural pattern onto a novel instance,
and (v) cross-modal association; the cognitive capacity to link
form and meaning. Thus there is a strong“cognitive commitment”
to explaining linguistic structure. As Taylor puts it, “the general
thrust of the cognitive linguistics enterprise is to render accounts
of syntax, morphology, phonology, and word meaning consonant
with aspects of cognition which are well documented, or at least
highly plausible, and which may manifest in non-linguistic (Taylor,
2002, p. 9).
As an example of this commitment, Ibbotson et al. (2012)
looked at whether we can “import” what we know about cate-
gorization of non-linguistic stimuli to explain language use. In a
classic study by Franks and Bransford (1971) they argued that a
prototype comprises of a maximal number of features common to
the category, often “averaged” across exemplars. They constructed
stimuli by combining geometric forms such as circles, stars, and tri-
angles into structured groups of various kinds. Some of these were
then shown to participants who were then later asked whether they
recognized these and other shapes they had not seen previously.
Importantly, one of the exemplars shown at test contained all of
the geometric forms together, an exemplar that had actually never
been shown previously (but could be considered the prototype
if all of the experienced exemplars were averaged). The partic-
ipants not only thought that they had seen this prototype, but
they were actually more confident that they had seen it than the
other previously seen exemplars (or distracter items which they
had not seen). Note that these effects were established for an ad hoc
non-linguistic category. Ibbotson et al. found the same pattern of
findings – misrecognition of prototypes – extends to the transitive
argument-structure construction, a fundamental building block
present in one form or another in all of the world’s languages
(Hopper and Thompson, 1980; Næss, 2007). They argued that
this shows abstract linguistic categories behave in similar ways to
non-linguistic categories, for example, by showing graded mem-
bership of a category (see also Ibbotson and Tomasello, 2009 for a
cross-linguistic, developmental perspective).
Focusing on analogy for the moment, in usage-based the-
ory, constructions can be analogous in form and/or meaning
(Figure 1), and there is good evidence that the alignment of
relational structure and mapping between representations is a
fundamental psychological process that underpins forming these
abstract connections (Goldstone et al., 1991; Goldstone, 1994;
Goldstone and Medin, 1994; Gentner and Markman, 1995).
There is quite a lot of evidence that people, including young
children, focus on these kinds of relations in making analogies
across linguistic constructions, with some of the most impor-
tant being the meaning of the words involved, especially the
verbs, and the spatial, temporal, and causal relations they encode
(e.g., Gentner and Markman, 1997; Gentner and Medina, 1998;
Tomasello, 2003). Bod (2009) showed how a computational learn-
ing algorithm was able use structural analogy, probabilistically,
to mimic children’s language development from item-based con-
structions to abstract constructions, including simulation of some
of the errors made by children in producing complex questions.
In usage-based theory, analogy also operates in a more abstract
sense, by extending the prototypical meaning of constructions. For
example, the meaning of the ditransitive construction is closely
associated with “transfer of possession” as in “John gave Mary a
goat.” Metaphorical extensions of this pattern, such as “John gave
the goat a kiss” or even “Cry me a river” are understood by analogy
to the core meaning of the construction from which they were
extended, which in the case of the ditransitive is something like “X
causes Y to receive Z” (Goldberg, 2006).
The relative frequency of items in a corpus obviously plays a
key role in many usage-based processes. Items that consistently
co-occur together in the speech stream and are consistently used
for the same function face a pressure to become automatized, in a
manner that is similar to those which occur in a variety of non-
linguistic sensory-motor skills. Thus, going to faces pressure to be
compressed or chunked to gonna. The ultimate message compres-
sion strategy would be to say nothing at all, thus, at many different
levels – grammatical, lexical, phonological – the linguistic system
is trying to balance the trade-off between the amount of linguistic
signal provided for a given message and the expectedness of that
message (Jaeger and Tily, 2011). Irregular patterns can survive in
the language because they are frequent enough to be learned and
Frontiers in Psychology | Language Sciences May 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 255 | 2
Ibbotson Usage-based theory
FIGURE 1 | Constructions grouped together on the basis of similarity of form and/or function (adapted from Croft and Cruse, 2004).
used on their own, whereas items and constructions that are less
frequent tend to get regularized by pattern-seeking children or,
in the extreme case, they drop out of use as children do not get
enough exposure to them. The more a linguistic unit is estab-
lished as a cognitive routine or “rehearsed” in the mind of the
speaker, the more it is said to be entrenched (Langacker, 1987).
Entrenchment is a matter of degree and essentially amounts to
strengthening whatever response the system makes to the inputs
that it receives (Hebb, 1949; Allport, 1985). The converse of this is
that extended periods of disuse will weaken representations. For
example, young infants are able to discriminate a wider range of
sounds that are present in their native language (Aslin et al., 1981).
Once this entrenchment is established as a routine it can be diffi-
cult to reverse. For example, Japanese speakers find it difficult to
discriminate between /r/ and /l/ because it activates a single rep-
resentation, whereas for English speakers the two representations
remain separately entrenched (Munakata and McClelland, 2003).
We will now look at the extent to which core usage-based cog-
nitive processes – like categorization, analogy, and chunking – can
explain the empirical findings in language acquisition, processing,
and change. Obviously these are all huge areas of research in their
own right and there is no way to test usage-based theory against
every finding. In the space we have, we try to focus on studies that
make key points and are indicative of the wider literature.
LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AND USE
The good news for children is that they usually do not have to
invent ways of communicating de novo. The language they are
born into is very likely to be the result of a long history of cumu-
lative cultural evolution and so provides them with off-the-peg
solutions to communicative problems. The bad news is that they
have to learn what these are.
USAGE PATTERNS
For a five-word string (e.g., I like your green cheese), with 20
words that can fill each slot, there are 3,200,000 possible five-
word sentences (205). An important point for both processing and
acquisition is that, in natural language the probability of encoun-
tering any given word or any combination of these words is not
equal. Specifically, there are a few forms that are encountered
relatively frequently whereas most are encountered rarely (Zipf,
1935/1965). As Shannon pointed out, this kind of redundancy
allows recovery of meaning xvxn whxn thx sxgnxl xs nxxsy (Shan-
non, 1951). Interestingly, this is true not only for letter sequences
and words (1 GRAM) but for sequences of words too (GRAM> 1),
Figure 2.
This formulaticity in language has consequences for learning.
Item-based or exemplar-based approaches to learning recognize
that a large part of a person’s language knowledge is constructed
from rather specific pieces of language, grounded in the expres-
sions people actually use during their everyday interactions. These
items or exemplars are stored in a way that is not far removed (in
terms of schematicity) from the way in which people encounter
them in natural discourse. Focusing on Child Directed Speech,
Cameron-Faulkner et al. (2003) found that a small number of
semi-formulaic frames account for a large amount of the data.
Frames like Where’s the X? I wanna X, More X, It’s a X, I’m X-ing
it, Put X here, Mommy’s X-ing it, Let’s X it, Throw X, X gone, I X-ed
it, Sit on the X, Open X, X here, There’s a X, X broken. Decades of
research support the general idea that children used these islands
of reliability when they are schematizing patterns in their language
(e.g., Tomasello, 2003; Ambridge and Lieven, 2011).
Pronouns are a particularly important source of reliability in
the input as children hear lots of these examples. Ibbotson et al.
(2011) systematically varied constructional cues (NP is verbing
NP vs. NP is getting verbed by NP) and case-marking cues on Eng-
lish pronouns (he/she vs. her/him vs. it ). These can be configured
as different “pronoun-frames,” for example (NPnominative – Verb –
NPaccusative) vs. (NPneuter – Verb – NPaccusative). In a pointing com-
prehension test, both 2- and 3-year-olds used the case-marking on
the pronoun frames to help them comprehend the sentences; this
despite the fact that English has a relatively restricted case system
compared to other languages like Finnish and Turkish. It shows
even very young English children are sensitive to complex patterns
of use – in this case comprehending the “value added” by case
in marking the semantic roles of transitives over and above that
of word order and other constructional cues. As Goldin-Meadow
(2007) has pointed out pronoun frames may also have special sta-
tus as they essentially act as deictic/pointing expressions. A child
can than map the gestural productivity of a point – which can refer
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FIGURE 2 | From Bannard and Lieven (2009).The figure plots the natural logarithm of the frequency of each string of words encountered against the natural
logarithm of the position of each string in a ranked list of these substrings. Words are taken from the 89 million word written component of the British National
Corpus (Burnard, 2000).
to anything in the world – onto the referential flexibility of lexical
pronouns.
This item-based view does not necessarily entail that children
do not, at some point, understand phrases like Susan tickles Mary
or words like hands as exemplars of a more general pattern or
schema, say X verbs Y or plural= noun+ s. It is a claim about
how children might get to this point of development and how
information is stored in the mind of the speaker. Exemplar-based
approaches are therefore as much about how language is repre-
sented as about the process of learning itself. In the usage-based
view of language acquisition, children first acquire a number of
lexical schemas or semi-formalic frames, e.g., X hits Y, X kisses Y,
X pushes Y, X pulls Y, then by forming analogies between the roles
that participants are playing in these events, these constructions
eventually coalesce into a general abstract construction, e.g., X
Verbtransitive Y (Tomasello, 2003; Bannard et al., 2009; Ibbotson,
2011).
Several researchers have attempted to simulate the process of
moving from items to schemas in more mechanistic terms with
computational models. For example, Bannard et al. (2009) built a
model of acquisition that begins with children learning concrete
words (exemplars) and phrases, with no categories or grammat-
ical abstractions of any kind. That model was then compared to
a model using grammatical categories and they found that the
category-less model provided the best account of 2-year-old chil-
dren’s early language. When categorical knowledge, comprising
nouns and verbs, was entered into this item-based model, perfor-
mance actually got worse. Importantly and in contrast, at 3 years of
age adding grammatical categories such as nouns and verbs helped
the performance, suggesting that these categories emerged around
the third year of life. Another important finding was that at 2 years
of age children’s item-based grammars were very different from
one another, whereas by 3 years of age children’s more category-
based grammars were more similar to one another, as the children
all began converging on, in this case, English grammar (see also
Bod, 2009 for a structural analogy model). Mechanisms of analogy
and generalizations are a key area of research in usage-based the-
ory and are discussed later in the sections on strengths, weaknesses,
and challenges.
Having introduced moving from items to schemas, usage-based
theory needs some proposal of how to constrain generalizations so
that children arrive at the same conventions as adult do. The three
main suggestions that would help children rule out some overgen-
eralizations are, in one way or another, all based on patterns of use
(see Ambridge et al., 2013 for more detailed supporting evidence
for each).
1. Entrenchment (Braine and Brooks, 1995): the more often a
child hears a verb in a particular syntactic context (e.g., I sug-
gested the idea to him) the less likely they are to use it in a
new context they haven’t heard it in (e.g., ∗I suggested him
the idea; Ambridge et al., 2012a; see also Perfors et al., 2010
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who use hierarchical Bayesian framework to model this kind of
generalization).
2. Pre-emption (Goldberg, 2006): if a child repeatedly hears a verb
in a construction (e.g., I filled the cup with water) that serves the
same communicative function as a possible unattested gener-
alization (e.g., ∗I filled water into the cup), then the child infers
that the generalization is not available (Ambridge et al., 2012b).
3. Construction semantics (Pinker, 1989): constructions are asso-
ciated with particular meanings (e.g., the transitive causative
with direct external causation). As children refine this knowl-
edge, they will cease to insert verbs that do not bear these
meaning elements into the construction (e.g., ∗The joke giggled
him; Ambridge et al., 2011).
WHAT WORDS REFER TO AND USAGE PATTERNS
Interestingly the issue of determining a word’s referent has often
been presented as one shot learning problem (following Quine,
1960) – evidently not the same problem children actually face. By
using invariant properties in the word-to-world mapping across
multiple situations, it has been shown children reduce the degrees
of freedom as to what nouns and verbs might mean, Figure 3
(Siskind, 1996; Smith and Yu, 2008; Scott and Fisher, 2012).
However powerful cross-situational learning is, it undoubt-
edly operates in combination with other cues to meaning. Yu
and Ballard (2007) found that a computational model of word-
learning performed better when it used social information (joint
attention and prosody) in combination with statistical cues (cross-
situational learning) than when it relied on purely statistical infor-
mation alone (see also Frank et al., 2009 for the integration of
pragmatic and statistical cues). Once the child has a foothold in
the language, the context of the novel word gives a clue as to what
kind of word it might be (Gleitman, 1990; Pinker, 1994). For exam-
ple, the usage patterns in English hint at the following possibilities
for pum (MacWhinney, 2005):
(1) Here is a pum (count noun).
(2) Here is Pum (proper noun).
(3) I am pumming (intransitive verb).
(4) I pummed the duck [transitive (causative) verb].
(5) I need some pum (mass noun).
(6) This is the pum one (adjective).
Eight-month-old infants are sensitive to the statistical tendency
that transitional probabilities are generally higher within words
than across words, helping them to find “words in a sea of sounds”
(Saffran et al., 1996; Saffran, 2001). Children are also able to dis-
cover syntactic regularities between categories of words as well as
the statistical regularities in sound patterns (Marcus et al., 1999).
By 12 months, infants can use their newly discovered word bound-
aries to discover regularities in the syntactic distributions of a
novel word-string grammar (Saffran and Wilson, 2003). And by
15 months old, infants are able to combine multiple cues in order
FIGURE 3 | An adult chooses a linguistic expression w1 associated with
concept r1 that they want to communicate. At t1 the child doesn’t know
whether the novel word w1 refers to r1 or r2 and for now the best she can do
is remember the associations between the scene and the words. At t2 she
hears w1 with one object r1 familiar from t1 and one new object r3.
Cross-situational learning works by repeatedly recording the associations
between language and the context in which it is used. Over time, the signal
(an intentional word-referent pair) is more strongly represented than the noise
(an unintentional word-referent pair). Items that appear in the hashed box are
the raw data on which the child makes the cross-situational associations.
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to learn morphophonological paradigmatic constraints (Gerken
et al., 2005). Note the domain-generality of this statistical learning
ability. 2-month-olds infants are sensitive to transitional probabil-
ities between visual shape sequences (Kirkham et al., 2002) thus
infants have already build up considerable expertize in statistical
learning by the time these linguistic effects appear.
ADULT’S USE AND CHILDREN’S USE
As usage-based theories would predict, errors in child speech, the
age at which structures are acquired, and the sequence that lan-
guage emerges can all be predicted on the basis of usage patterns
in the input. For example,
• The acquisition order of wh-questions (What, Where, When,
Why, How) is predicted from the frequency with which particu-
lar wh-words and verbs occur in children’s input (Rowland and
Pine, 2000; Rowland et al., 2003).
• Children’s proportional use of me-for-I errors (e.g., when the
child says “me do it”) correlates with their caregivers’ pro-
portional use of me in certain contexts (e.g., “let me do it”
(Kirjavainen et al., 2009).
• The pattern of negator emergence (no→ not→ ’nt ) follows the
frequency of negators in the input; that is negators used fre-
quently in the input are the first to emerge in the child’s speech
(Cameron-Faulkner et al., 2007).
• Children’s willingness to construct a productive schema reflects
their experience with analogous lexical patterns in the input
(Bannard and Matthews, 2010).
• Children are less likely to make errors on sentences containing
high-frequency verbs compared low frequency verbs (Brooks
and Tomasello, 1999; Theakston, 2004; Ambridge et al., 2008).
Overall it seems there is good evidence to support the usage-
based prediction that language structure emerges in ontogeny out
of experience (viz. use) and when a child uses core usage-based
cognitive processes – categorization, analogy, form-meaning map-
ping, chunking, exemplar/item-based representations – to find and
use communicatively meaningful units.
LANGUAGE PROCESSING AND USE
In this section we look at how the “cognitive commitment” of
usage-based theory has been used to explain findings in language
processing.
HOWWORDS ARE STORED AND USED
The approach from the generativist tradition has been to pro-
pose a fundamental division of labor between linguistic units
and the rules that combine them into acceptable combinations,
for example, singular muggle + plural marker s= plural muggles
(e.g., Pinker, 1999). The usage-based view is that productivity is
a result of knowledge generalized over usage events. Pluralizing a
new word like muggle is by analogy to a relevant class of linguis-
tic experience. Even regular forms, such as books, dogs, and cars,
if encountered frequently enough are represented and stored as
chunks. This process combines several of the core cognitive prin-
ciples we are interested in here – categorization, analogy, chunking,
and a rich memory for exemplars so plural formation is a good to
test case for usage-based theory.
The well-established and unsurprising fact is that people are
quicker to recognize high-frequency words; the more often a word
is encountered the more entrenched that representation is and the
more easily it is retrieved. The interesting question here is whether
peoples’ response times are influenced by the frequency of the
plural word form, e.g., books or by the combined frequency of the
forms book + books. If plurals are stored separately, as predicted
by usage-based approaches, we should expect that the frequency
of the plural to be the crucial factor. Sereno and Jongman (1997)
flashed words interspersed with non-words onto a monitor and
asked participants whether the word was a word or not. They
created two lists of nouns which were matched for their over-
all frequency in the language, but differed with respect to the
ratio of singular to plural forms. List A contained words which
predominantly occurred in the singular (island, river, kitchen, vil-
lage) whereas list B contained forms that occurred equally often
in singular and plural forms (statement, window, expense, error).
In support of the usage-based hypothesis, singulars from List A
were recognized more quickly than singulars from list B and plu-
rals from group B were recognized more quickly than plurals from
list A. Further research confirms their conclusions for plural for-
mation (e.g., Baayen et al., 1997; Alegre and Gordon, 1999) and
the same argument, namely, that high-frequency forms tend to be
stored and processed as wholes, has also been extended to cover
past tense formation in English (Bybee, 1999). The overall picture
is one of a rich memory for exemplars, whereby sequences of units
that frequently co-occur cohere to form more complex chunks
(Reali and Christiansen, 2007; Ellis et al., 2008; Kapatsinski and
Radicke, 2009).
This sensitivity to detailed distributional information exists not
just at the levels of words but on many levels of linguistic analysis;
from words to larger chunks to phrases (see Diessel, 2007 and Ellis,
2002 for reviews). For example, in a series of studies, Arnon and
Neal (2010) showed that comprehenders are sensitive to the fre-
quencies of compositional four-word phrases (e.g., don’t have to
worry) such that more frequent phrases were processed faster (cf.
Bannard and Matthews, 2010 for an interesting comparison with
children). The effect was not reducible to the frequency of the
individual words or substrings and was observed across the entire
frequency range (for low-, mid-, and high-frequency phrases).
They conclude that comprehenders seem to learn and store fre-
quency information about multi-word phrases. These findings
adds to the growing processing literature that broadly supports
the usage-based position: processing models capture and predict
multi-level frequency effects and support accounts where linguis-
tic knowledge consists of patterns of varying sizes and levels of
abstraction.
Overall the psycholinguistic evidence supports the idea that
representations are instantiated in a vast network of structured
knowledge, which is encyclopedia-like in nature and in scope (see
review by Elman, 2009). Knowledge of fairly specific (and some-
times idiosyncratic) aspects of verbal usage patterns is available
and recruited early in sentence processing. For example:
• Sentences of the type the boy heard the story was interesting have
structural ambiguity. At the point of parsing the story, it could be
the direct object (DO) of heard or it could be the subject noun
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of a sentential complement (SC), as it was in the above example.
Hare et al. (2003, 2004) showed that it was possible to induce a
DO or SC readings of the same verb on the basis of whether the
preverbal context was associated with one reading or another
(as determined from a corpus of natural speech). The message
here is that people are sensitive to statistical patterns of usage
that are associated with specific usages of an individual verb.
• McRae et al. (1998) showed that The cop arrested promoted
a main verb reading (the cop arrested X) over a reduced rela-
tive (the cop arrested by the X). Conversely, the criminal arrested
promoted a reduced relative over a main verb reading. McRae
concludes that the thematic role specifications for verbs must
go beyond the traditional categories like agent, patient instru-
ment, beneficiary to include very detailed information about
the preferred fillers of the role and the prototypical events in
which they take part (in the above example that criminals are
more likely to be arrested than do the arresting and vice versa
for cops).
• Homonyms prime each other, for example bank (financial insti-
tution) momentarily activates the representation bank (land
side of river), showing that linguistic knowledge is organized
along phonological as well as the semantic dimensions (see
Figure 1) (Swinney, 1979; Seidenberg et al., 1982).
All of this argues against a serial account of sentence processing
where syntax proposes a structural interpretation for semantics to
subsequently cash out (Frazier, 1987, 1989; Clifton and Frazier,
1989). Moreover, verbal knowledge is sensitive to contingencies
(usage patterns) that hold across agents, aspect, instruments, event
knowledge, and broader contextual discourse, so that altering
any one may skew the construal of what is communicated. It
seems unlikely then that syntactic knowledge is encapsulated from
semantic, pragmatic, and world knowledge (e.g., Fodor, 1995).
Rather, the evidence is converging on the idea of words as proba-
bilistic cues that point to a conceptual space of possibilities, which
is revised and honed as the discourse unfolds between speakers.
LANGUAGE DIVERSITY AND USE
Like all scientific enterprises, linguistics is in the business of find-
ing and explaining patterns. Why are languages the way they are,
rather than some other way they could be? Again, we will exam-
ine the extent to which the cognitive commitment of usage-based
linguistics has been able to account for findings at this level of
description. Word order provides a good example. The world’s lan-
guages can be categorized on the basis of how they order the basic
constituents of a sentence – subject, object, and verb – which func-
tion to coordinate “who did what to whom.” Of the six logically
possible word orders this creates, some are much more prevalent
than others. A survey of 402 languages reveals that the majority of
languages favor either SOV (44.78%) or SVO (41.79%) with the
other possibilities – VSO (9.20%), VOS (2.99%), OVS (1.24%), or
OSV (0.00%) – significantly less popular (Tomlin, 1986).
There are several mechanisms that could be at work here to
create this typological distribution. For example, we know there
is a general preference to speak of given information before infor-
mation that is new to the discourse (MacWhinney and Bates,
1978; Bock and Irwin, 1980; Prat-Sala and Branigan, 2000; Ferreira
and Yoshita, 2003), a preference for shorter dependency length
(Hawkins, 1994, 2007) and a preference for efficient informa-
tion transfer (Maurits et al., 2010). Over historical time frames
the serial position becomes grammaticalized into subject, verb,
and object position, hence Givón’s (1979, p. 208–209) aphorism
“today’s syntax is yesterday’s pragmatic discourse.” However, this
doesn’t explain why any particular language looks the way it does;
here we need a historical perspective. Dunn et al. (2011) used
computational phylogenetics to show that typological variation in
word order could be explained as a function of the iterated learning
processes of cultural evolution. Croft et al. (2011) provide criticism
of their methodology – the absence of any Type II error analysis
to assess the rate of false negatives, the absence of contact effects
and the nature of the phylogenies used – although they are in favor
of the general approach. These criticisms do not undermine the
wider point, namely, that popularity of word orders across lan-
guages can be explained in terms of general cognitive principles
(e.g., pressure for iconicity of form and function, or concise rep-
resentation of salient/frequent concepts; see section below). Why
any particular language has come to the combination of solutions it
has, needs reference to its historical antecedents/evolution (Bybee,
2010). To preface a distinction we return to in the final section, this
can be thought of as the difference between cognition permitting
a particular language vs. cognition entailing a particular language.
In the context of historical antecedents, an analogy with bio-
logical evolution may be informative. Evolution has to work with
what it’s got, cumulatively tinkering with solutions to problems
that have worked well enough for previous generations, but which
might not be considered “ideal” if one could start afresh (e.g., the
backward installed retina in humans). An evolutionary biologist
could ask the question “Why do we only see the mammals we do
given all the possible mammals that could exist but don’t?” For
the biologist, different mammals could be thought of as a record
of competing motivations, that have over time explored some of
the space of what is physiological plausible for a mammal to be.
For a particular feature of the animal’s development, for example
the skeleton, a bat could be thought of as occupying one corner
of this space while an elephant skeleton is in another – extreme
variations on an underlying theme. Different languages are also a
history of competing motivations that have explored some of the
space of what is communicatively possible. Over time languages
have radiated to different points in this space. For a particular fea-
ture of the language development, for example the sound system,
in one corner there might be a three-vowel system (e.g., Green-
landic, an Eskimo-Aleut language) while in another corner is a
language with 24 vowels (e.g., !Xu, a Khoisan language). Impor-
tantly, as language is a complex adaptive system, evolving toward
an extreme in one direction will have functional consequences for
the system as a whole. Just as a bat skeleton will place certain func-
tional demands on the rest of its physiology, so it is with language.
In languages with freer word order, the communicative work that
is done by a fixed word order in other languages must be picked
up by other aspects of the system, e.g., morphology and pragmatic
inference. The analogy with biological evolution might be useful in
another way. The eye has independently evolved in several different
species, converging on a similar solution to a similar engineering
problem. The major nuts and bolts of grammar (e.g., word-order,
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case-agreement, tense-aspect) that appear time after time in the
world’s languages could be thought of as historically popular solu-
tions to similar communicative and coordination problems, such
as sharing, requesting, and informing. Having set out the general
usage-based picture with respect to the role of history, we take a
closer look at the cognitive constraints on cross-linguistic struc-
ture and assess whether this helps explain typological similarity
and diversity.
EXPLAINING SIMILARITY AND DIVERSITY
The idea that languages are mostly alike has been undermined
by the growing amount of evidence that languages are actually
quite distinct (e.g., Bowerman and Choi, 2001; Evans and Levin-
son, 2009). The remaining similarities can typically be explained
with respect to four domain-general classes of constraint which
simultaneously act to shape language: perceptuo-motor factors,
cognitive limitations on learning and processing, constraints from
thought, and pragmatic constraints (e.g., Goldberg, 2006; Dies-
sel, 2007, 2011; Ambridge and Goldberg, 2008; Christiansen and
Chater, 2008).
Information-theoretic approaches to communicative efficiency
have shown how human cognitive abilities directly or indirectly
constrain the space of possible grammars (for a recent review of
this, see Jaeger and Tily, 2011). Processing difficulty in compre-
hension and production can arise when the sentence overloads
the memory systems or contains combinations of words which
are infrequent, unexpected or for which there are competing cues.
There are several ways in which on-line processing difficulty and a
drive for communicative efficiency might constrain the typological
distribution of grammars, for example, in acquisition, less com-
plex forms might be learned preferentially due to higher frequency
in the input. The processing approach to typology suggests that
grammars preferentially conventionalize linguistic structures that
are processed more efficiently (Hawkins, 1994, 2007). Evidence
from English and German suggests that the average dependency
length (known to correlate with processing difficulty; e.g., Gibson,
1998) in these languages is close to the theoretical minimum and
far below what would be expected by chance (e.g., Gildea and Tem-
perley, 2010). Moreover, work investigating learner’s preferences
in the artificial language learning paradigm show that (a) learners
of experimentally designed languages acquire typologically fre-
quent patterns more easily than typologically infrequent patterns
(Christiansen, 2000; Finley and Badecker, 2008; Hupp et al., 2009,
St Clair et al., 2009); and, (b) learners restructure the input they
receive shifting the acquired language toward typologically natural
patterns (Fedzechkina et al., 2011; Culbertson et al., 2012).
The sheer diversity of forms that languages take presents all the-
ories with a massive challenge. For example, as far as know, Pirahã
is the only language in the world to use the sound of a voiced lin-
guolabial lateral double-flap (Everett, 2012). As Everett points out,
all theories of language would struggle to predict both its existence
and rarity. In fact, it is much easier to identify common patterns
of language change than it is to find cross-linguistic similarities
(Bybee, 2010). Usage-based theories argue this is because there is
a universal set of cognitive processes underlying cross-linguistic
cycles (e.g., grammaticization, pidginization, and creolization)
and the fact that all languages have to pass through the bottleneck
of what is learnable (Bybee et al., 1994; Diessel, 2007, 2011; Heine
and Kuteva, 2007; Christiansen and Chater, 2008).
SPEAKING THE SAME LANGUAGE
It is uncontroversial that, as a function of linguistic experience,
different speakers of the same language have different dialects,
vocabularies, phrases, idioms, accents, and so on. For some rea-
son, many linguists from all theoretical persuasions have resisted
applying this logic to grammar. There is a wide spread assumption
that adults are converging on the same grammar when they learn
a particular language (Seidenberg, 1997, p. 9; Crain and Lillo-
Martin, 1999, p. 1600; Nowak et al., 2001, p. 114). Da˛browska
(2012) challenges the prevailing wisdom by showing that different
speakers have different grammars as a function of their individual
usage histories. For example, the inflections on the polish dative are
highly predictable and so in theory all adults should share the same
intuitions: -owi for masculine nouns, -u for neuter nouns, and -e,
-i/y for feminines. Da˛browska (2008) asked adults to use nonce
words, presented in the nominative, in contexts that required the
dative. Individual scores on the inflection task ranged from 29 to
100% correct. The usage-based hypothesis would predict famil-
iarity with noun exemplars (and thus familiarity with inflecting
them) would correlate with the productivity of a particular mor-
phological schema. This is what was found, with performance on
the task positively correlated with vocabulary (r = 0.65,p < 0.001),
which is itself correlated strongly in this experiment with years
spent in formal education (r = 0.72, p < 0.001).
Analogous adult variation in comprehension has been demon-
strated with the active-passive distinction (Da˛browska and Street,
2006) and quantifiers in English (Brooks and Sekerina, 2006).
The fact that both passive and quantifier performance could be
improved with training (Street and Da˛browska, 2010) underlies
the role of use. Da˛browska (2012) concludes that the results from
English and Polish show that some speakers extract only fairly
specific, local, and lexically based generalization whereas others
are able to be more flexible and apply more abstract patterns. In
general, this ability was tightly correlated with use, in a partic-
ular a more varied linguistic experience, which in this case was
often education-related. It is worth noting that in the terminology
of generativist grammar, we are talking about core competence
here: passives, complex sentences, quantifiers, and morphological
inflection. Different levels of grammatical attainment in healthy
adults – even in “core competency” – are what one would expect
if people build their grammar bottom-up as a function of their
linguistic experience.
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS AND USE
Is there any broad philosophy that a usage-based approach to lan-
guage follows? One candidate would be a non-essentialist view of
describing the world (Janicki, 2006; Goldberg, 2009). Plato used
the Greek word logos to mean the “ultimate essence”; the underly-
ing reality or true nature of a thing that one cannot observe directly.
So for instance, we understand circles as circles with respect to
an abstract, unchanging ideal of what a circle is, laid out by well-
defined criteria, such as“its area is equal topir2.”With this mindset,
one can then sensibly ask what is the essential quiddity or “what-
ness” for all sorts of things; “what is beauty,” “what is truth,” and
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so on. This kind of essentialist thinking was reincarnated in the
philosophy of the Logical Positivists who sought to verify whether
propositions were true or false with respect to the underlying log-
ical structure of language. If we could only do this, as Leibniz had
hoped, then “two philosophers who disagree about a point should,
instead of arguing fruitlessly and endlessly, be able to take out their
pencils, sit down amicably at their desks, and say ‘Let us calculate.”’
In one of the most famous (and honest) about-turns in intel-
lectual history, Wittgenstein (1953/2001) completely abandoned
his involvement in this approach, no longer so interested in the
relationship between meaning and truth as that between mean-
ing and use – hence the quote at the beginning of this article.
The change in his thinking can be summarized in the change of
his metaphors; from language as a picture (true propositions are
those that picture the world as it is) to language as a tool. Tools are
defined by what they do, how they are used. He realized that the
labeling of a word presupposes understanding a deeper agreement
between communicators about the way the word is being used. In
relation to this he advocated the anti-essentialist notion of family-
resemblance; the idea that categories are graded in nature, with
better-or-worse exemplars. Against this backdrop of normative
agreements, we can do things with language. Performatives such
as I declare you man and wife, You are now under arrest, I condemn
you to prison, I name this child, I promise to pay the bearer, impinge
on the world because of the mutually held belief between members
of a group that in certain contexts these words have force (Austin,
1962; Searle, 1969).
Despite the influence of Wittgenstein, essentialist thinking was
still alive and well in much of twentieth century linguistics: the
idea that there is an essence of a word that could neatly fit into a
lexicon, rather than seeing words as instantiated in a vast network
of encyclopedic knowledge (Elman, 2009); the idea that there is an
essence of language that all speakers of the same language share,
rather than an overlapping set of intuitions defined by the linguis-
tic experience of the individuals (Da˛browska, 2012); the idea that
there is an universal essence to grammar (justifying a distinction
between competence and performance), rather than acknowledg-
ing the diversity across languages (Bowerman and Choi, 2001;
Evans and Levinson, 2009).
Following Popper (1957), evolutionary theorist Mayr (1942)
suggested the antidote for essentialism is “population thinking” –
a profile of characteristics across a group – just as Wittgenstein
had discussed with the idea of family resemblance. It was this kind
slipperiness in language that ultimately frustrated the Logical Pos-
itivists but which usage-based approaches have turned it into a
productive research agenda: prototypes, conceptual metaphors,
and probabilistic approaches to syntactic and lexical processing
(Ellis, 2002; MacDonald and Christiansen, 2002; Jurafsky, 2003)
and grammatical continua, for example, from more verb-like to
less noun-like (Harris, 1981; Taylor, 2003).
SUCCESSES, CHALLENGES, AND DEBATES FOR THE
USAGE-BASED APPROACH
From the evidence reviewed here, the cognitive commitment of
usage-based linguistics“to render accounts of syntax, morphology,
phonology, and word meaning consonant with aspects of cogni-
tion” has accounted for a large range of empirical findings across
the domains of language acquisition, processing, and typology. It
is of course not without its weaknesses and is there is by no means
a consensus as to what usage-based theory is or should be. Here
we reflect on what some these debates are, which leads to the final
section on where usage-based theory might go from here.
Perhaps unsurprisingly some of the strengths of usage-based
theory are also related to its weaknesses; what it gains in breath
of explanation it sometimes compromises in depth, for exam-
ple being able to accommodate a large range of cross-linguistic
findings means that stipulating in any detail, a priori, which pro-
cessing constraints and input properties are most important, and
when, is very difficult. The problem can be particularly acute in
language-acquisition research. The hope is, that once enough of
these types of experiments have been conducted, and the results
synthesized, usage-based theory will evolve into something that
generates tighter “riskier” predictions in the Popperian sense. This
would also go a long way to engaging those from different theo-
retical approaches to language acquisition who are skeptical of the
usage-based approach for this reason – “what pattern of results
couldn’t a usage-based theory explain.” One kind of approach that
seems particularly successful in generating this kind of rigor is
combining corpus and experimental methods to answer a focused
question about learning (e.g., Goldberg et al., 2004; Da˛browska,
2008; Bannard and Matthews, 2010). In this approach one can use
the distributions in the input as the starting point to generate pre-
dictions, and then through experimental manipulation, get closer
to establishing some kind of cause-and-effect.
Those working in non-usage-based theory can become frus-
trated when usage-based theorists argue lexical specificity supports
the theory, but then are also not worried by evidence of abstrac-
tion, since the child’s knowledge is predicted to become abstract
at some point in development anyway. Clear developmental pre-
dictions about how the process of abstraction should develop,
including which systems should become abstract first, are needed.
This would also help counter claims that the theory is discontin-
uous (lexical specificity first, abstraction later). Clearly related to
this issue is being able to model language acquisition as a complex
dynamic system. For instance, say a child hears the utterance The
dog tickles Mary. With no other analog in her experience she treats
it as an instance of itself, perhaps even storing it as the chunk
ThedogticklesMary. One might think of this as all constructions
starting life toward the more idiomatic end of the constructional
spectrum. However, the next time she hears The dog tickles Peter
it “counts” as both an instance of The dog tickles Peter and an
instance of The dog tickles X. The constriction has moved from
being purely idiomatic to having a productive slot, X. The differ-
ence between this and kick the bucket is that the latter is much less
productive; compare hit the bucket, kick the pail1. After many more
examples, the child then hears The dog tickles Mary for the second
time but now it might count as an instance of The dog tickles Mary,
The dog tickles X, The Y tickles X, agent-action-patient, subject verb
object, and so on. So, the same form is counted as different instances
of different things at different times. The situation is analogous to
1In fact even this idiom shows some flexibility in tense: he is going to kickØ the bucket
vs. he has kicked the bucket.
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believing a bat is an instance of a bird and then re-categorizing later
it as a mammal, as one learns more about the world. The ques-
tion is, which level of representation do developmental models
count and when? Usage-based theories need more psychologically
plausible models of what gets treated as a chunk when, and hence
“counted” in any distributional analysis (Arnon, 2011). Dynamic
systems theory and connectionist models try to address this issue
by designing models that grow and internally reorganize them-
selves (e.g., Thelen and Smith, 1995) but it remains an outstanding
challenge for a descriptively and predictively adequate usage-based
theory.
A key part of responding to this challenge will be to spec-
ify in greater detail the mechanisms of generalization, specifi-
cally a mechanistic account of the dimensions over which chil-
dren and adults make (and do not make) analogies. As usage-
based approaches have argued, relational structure, and mapping
between representations is a fundamental psychological process
that underpins forming these abstract connections. In terms of lin-
guistic form, we know variation sets are powerful cross-sentential
cues to generalization – two or more sentences that share at least
one lexical element, for example, look at the bunny, the bunny
is brown, silly bunny, what a cute bunny, and so on (Küntay
and Slobin, 1996; Waterfall, 2006; Waterfall and Edelman, 2009).
Longitudinal studies show that infants are better at structurally
appropriate use of nouns and verbs that had occurred in their
caregivers’ speech within variation sets, compared to those that
did not (Nelson,1977; Hoff-Ginsberg,1986,1990;Waterfall, 2006).
Moreover, the cue is relatively available: between 20 and 80% of
utterances in a sample of English CDS occur within these varia-
tion sets – depending on the threshold of intervening sentences
and therefore the definition of “set” (similar statistics apply to
Turkish and Mandarin, Küntay and Slobin, 1996; Waterfall, 2006).
Clearly generalizations are made not just over form but over mean-
ing also (even if the forms share nothing in common) and here
there is less consensus on what counts as a variation set of mean-
ing or even how to formalize one. Usage-based approaches might
respond by saying that the meaning is the sum total of how the
form is used in a communicative context, however for those seek-
ing more detail, usage-based theorists need to provide a more
mechanistic accounts that integrates semantic and formal gener-
alizations. One way to tackle this is to ask, where does the meaning
of linguistic form x come from in the child’s environment? For
example, in many of the world’s languages grammatical aspect is
used to indicate how events unfold over time. In English, activ-
ities that are ongoing can be distinguished from those that are
completed using the morphological marker -ing. Using naturalis-
tic observations of children, Ibbotson et al. (2013b) quantified the
availability and reliability of the imperfective form in the commu-
nicative context of the child performing actions. They found two
features of the communicative context reliably mapped onto the
functions of the imperfective, namely, that events are construed as
ongoing and from within. In theory grammatical aspect is poten-
tially an abstract notion, however, this shows how the pragmatic
and referential context in which a child hears language may serve
to limit the degrees of freedom on what linguistics constructions
mean and therefore the directions in which analogies are made
(see also Ibbotson, 2011).
“The usage-based” approach is of course something of a gener-
alization in itself; there are almost as many usage-based theories as
there are theorists. A major contention in the field, which points
to future research, is over what level of representation best char-
acterizes usage patterns. For example, although Ninio (2011) and
Goldberg (2006) agree on many of the cognitive principles that
underpin usage-based approaches, they radically disagree about
the role of semantic similarity in generalization and what are
the fundamental units of grammar. Namely, whether they are
best characterized as merge-dependency couplets or construc-
tions. Schematic constructions like X verbs Y are by no means
deemed necessary for all usage-based accounts either. For example,
Daelemans and van den Bosch’s (2005) radically exemplar-based
computational model, which is still very much rooted in the cog-
nitive linguistic, usage-based approach, questions the necessity
of schematic knowledge. The implication is that a large amount
of linguistic knowledge may consist of rather specific, low-level
knowledge, ultimately instantiated in the memory traces of specific
instances. Alternatively, some cognitive grammars posit a degree
of schematicity, but only to the extent that they are schematic
for actually occurring structures and actually occurring instances.
Croft (2001) argues that such things as subjects and DO only exist
in constructions (not as schemas that exists as themselves) and are
different entities when they appear in different constructions, for
example a transitive-subject, a passive-subject, and there-subject.
In general though, what unifies usage-based models is a general
skepticism about underlying structures that diverge from surface
structure with respect to the ordering and content of constituent
parts (Langacker, 1987).
Another potential area of development relates to the interface
between social-cognitive representations and grammatical repre-
sentations. There is a lot of work that has emerged in recent years
on infants’ development of social cognition and pragmatic rea-
soning, but it has yet to be worked through in any detail how
that understanding interacts with and/or constrains syntactic rep-
resentations and generalizations. It seems important then that
usage-based approaches start integrating the wealth of experimen-
tal data on social cognition with the statistical syntactic learning
literature. One area that seems particularly relevant here is the
grammar-attention interface. For example, Ibbotson et al. (2013a)
investigated whether children (3- and 4-year-olds) and adults can
use the active/passive alternation – essentially a choice of sub-
ject – in a way that is consistent with the eye-gaze of the speaker.
Previous work suggests the function of the subject position can be
grounded in attentional mechanisms (Tomlin, 1995, 1997). Eye-
gaze is one powerful source of directing attention that we know
adults and young children are sensitive to; furthermore, we know
adults are more likely to look at the subject of their sentence than
any other character (Griffin and Bock, 2000; Gleitman et al., 2007).
They demonstrated that older children and adults are able to use
speaker-gaze to choose a felicitous subject when describing a scene
with both agent-focused and patient focused cues.
Taking the “developmental cognitive linguistics” enterprise to
its logical conclusion, one of the big questions is whether there
are any purely linguistic representations or can all linguistic cat-
egories be traced back or decomposed into the functional or
communicative roles they play. In the next section we outline why
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there might be fundamental limits of what we can explain with a
purely cognitive conception of usage-based processes.
CULTURE AND USE
Overall it might be argued that, while significant challenges
remain, the usage-based commitment to domain-general cognitive
processes has been able to account for a large range of empirical
findings across the domains of language acquisition, processing,
and typology. Below we briefly sketch out some examples that do
not seem to fit easily into this category and present a challenge for
a cognitive process level of explanation.
Several authors have argued that we need to acknowledge
language as part of a broader species-specific adaptation for cul-
tural life in general, with linguistic norms as specific coordina-
tion solutions to the general problem of coordination (Clark,
1996; Tomasello, 1999, 2008; Everett, 2012). It is important to
outline what one thinks is special about humans as many of
the usage-based claims about core cognitive processes in lan-
guage – categorization, chunking, rich item-based memory –
are likely to be true of other species (and computers). How-
ever once our view of language, and more generally of com-
munication, is one of a social act in the context of norma-
tive agreements and cooperative reasoning, it is possible to
say why domain-general cognitive processes and even species-
general processes might be necessary but not sufficient for
language.
GROUPISHNESS AND NORMATIVITY
People see themselves as belonging to families, cliques, nations,
clans, religions – and of course languages. Being part of a group
comes with expectations about how one ought to act and think –
norms. For example, I tacitly expect other English speakers to put
adjectives before the noun they modify. And if they don’t I might
tell them that they should.
Cross-culturally, people seem particularly adept at reasoning
about normative matters compared to non-normative matters
(Cosmides and Tooby, 2008). By 3-years-of-age children are bet-
ter at reasoning about violations in deontic conditionals, e.g., if
x then y must/should do z, than they are with indicative con-
ditions, e.g., if x then y does z (Cummins, 1996a,b; Harris and
Núñez, 1996). We also know young children from diverse cultural
backgrounds “overimitate” adults’ behavior, for instance copying
non-functional means to a goal-directed action (Lyons et al., 2007;
Nielsen and Tomaselli, 2010). By comparison, Chimpanzees in
same situation drop the unnecessary steps and focus on the goal
(Tennie et al., 2009; Whiten et al., 2009). This is important as
the ability to produce high fidelity copies of cultural tools is a
necessary precursor for cumulative cultural evolution to work: if
you can’t copy a wheel then you will have to wait for someone
to reinvent it. Moreover, the advantage of a general adaptation
to imitate is that it doesn’t need to specify “copy what works”
because the fact that enough adults are doing it shows at the
very least it works well enough for them to still be alive (on aver-
age). Chimpanzees seem to exhibit some evolutionary precursors
of normative cognition (tolerant societies, well-developed social-
cognitive skills, empathetic competence) but appear to lack the
shared intentionality that would convert quasi-social norms into
human-like collectivized norms (Tomasello and Rakoczy, 2003;
Rudolf von Rohr et al., 2011). Thus it seems natural selection has
favored some important elements of the architecture of normative
cognition – a disposition to learn prevalent norms (imitation) to
comply with norms and enforce them (Boyd and Richerson, 1992;
Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Boyd et al., 2003; Chudek and Henrich,
2011).
CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON GRAMMAR
What is really interesting for the present discussion is when cul-
ture and a normative cognition start to interact in a way that starts
to constrain grammar. Kulick (1992, p. 2) explains an example
of where a linguistic niche is acquired and maintained through
normative cognition and is clearly grammatical in nature. Kulick
describes New Guinean communities that have “purposely fos-
tered linguistic diversity because they have seen language as a
highly salient marker of group identity. . .[they] have cultivated
linguistic differences as a way of “exaggerating” themselves in rela-
tion to their neighbors . . . One community [of Buian language
speakers], for instance, switched all its masculine and feminine
gender agreements, so that its language’s gender markings were the
exact opposite of those of the dialects of the same language spo-
ken in neighboring villages; other communities replaced old words
with new ones in order to “be different” from their neighbors’
dialects.”
Kulick (1992) also gives examples from the Selepet speakers of
a New Guinean village who, overnight, decided to change their
word for “no” from bia to bune explaining that they wanted to be
distinct from other Selepet speakers in a neighboring village. The
Buian gender agreement example does not sit easily in any of the
core usage-based cognitive processes of categorization, analogy,
chunking, and so on, that featured so prominently in the previous
sections – at least not in a way that is predictive of the Buian struc-
tural change. Instead of principles of communicative efficiency,
ease of understanding, informational organization, and so on we
have to appeal to a different source of linguistic structure to explain
the patterns we see, namely the kind of normative reasoning and
cultural learning we discussed above (swopping gender agreement
to be different from your neighbors does not really have anything
to do with communicative efficiency, indeed, in the short term
it probably reduces efficiency). So, the interesting examples are
where grammatical structure itself is being shaped by culture and
this has important implications for explaining linguistic patterns
within usage-based approaches. Below we briefly introduce three
examples:
1. When a concept is sufficiently prominent in a culture, that is
part of the shared values, it can predict what is left unsaid, as
in the case of Amele a language spoken in New Guinea. It is an
SOV language but when the meaning of “giving” is expressed
the verb is omitted. For example
Jo eu ihaciadigen
House that show
‘I will show that house to you’
The verb ihac means “to show” but in the example below the
verb is omitted
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Naus Dege houten
Name name pig
‘Naus [gave] a pig to Dege’
(Everett, 2012, p. 194)
Roberts (1998) argues that there is no verb “to give” because
giving is so basic to Amele culture that this can be left
backgrounded.
2. Speakers of Wari’, an Amazonian Indian language, report on
others’ thoughts, character, reactions, and other intentional
states by means of a quotative structure. Regardless of whether
people say something or not they are quoted as saying so in
order to communicate what the speaker believes they were
thinking. Everett (2012) argues this structure can be traced
back to, and explained by, the way Amazonian Indians use a
metaphor of “motives” and “will,” as in “the sky says it is going
to rain,” “the Tapir says it will run from me,” and “John said he
was tired of talking with us,” even when John did not say this,
but he behaved as though he did. Because of this the verb “to
say” is omitted and the quotation structure (capitalized below)
in Wari’ acts as the verb:
MA’ CO MAO NAIN GUJARÁ nanam ‘oro narima, taramaxi-
con
‘Who went to the city of Guajará?’ [said] the chief to the
women.’
(Everett, 2012, p. 196)
In Wari a high cultural value is placed on evidence for beliefs
and since intentions require first-hand evidence this created a
linguistic niche filled by the quotative structure which does not
commit the speaker to first-hand knowledge.
3. Relatedly, Pirahã, another Amazonian language, requires evi-
dence for assertions – a declarative has to be witnessed, heard
from a third party or reasoned from the facts. Pirahã marks
this with a suffix, for example – hiai (hearsay), sibiga (deduced
or inferred), and xáágahá (observed). The verb and the objects
implicated by the verb are obliged to be licensed by the verb’s
evidential suffix. The culture places high value on evidence for
declarations, which in turn is realized on the evidential suffix,
which in turn controls the verbal frame. Because in most lan-
guages evidentials are limited to main clauses, the claim is that
embedding clauses (recursion) is not possible in Pirahã on a
clausal level – as a subordinate clause would not be licensed by
the evidential, violating the cultural/grammatical constraints.
There are other intriguing lines of research that show how cul-
ture impinges on grammar, for example, Deixis, grammar, and
culture (Perkins, 1992) describes an inverse correlation between
the technological state of a culture and the complexity of their
pronoun system. More generally, the key point here is that there
exists a pattern of structural use, omission, and agreement that is
difficult to predict without expanding the circle of explanations
to include cultural as well as cognitive factors. The interpretations
of these patterns are controversial (Corballis, 2011) and riddled
with potential confounds but they do point to level of linguistic
analysis that might be beyond usage-based cognitive principles.
The same argument can be applied at different levels of gran-
ularity depending on which source of cultural variation we are
focused on. We have known since the work of Labov and Trudgill
that heterogeneity in language structure correlates with socio-
linguistic variables of class, social network, and ethnicity, for
example – all of which could analyzed within a normative frame-
work. What this means is that usage-based cognitive constraints
permit a possible space of languages but might not entail any par-
ticular language – the boundaries of the space of cognition do
not make contact with that of language in way that allows those
predictions. The rather weak predictive synthesis between these
domains is in some sense a consequence of the “cognitive commit-
ment” which seeks to make linguistics “merely” consonant with
aspects of cognition. The integration of cultural constrains with
cognitive constraints will place further limits on the space of pos-
sible and impossible languages, creating tighter predictions. This
would be an example of reductionism – or consilience to use E.
O. Wilson’s term – in the better sense of the word: where each
domain of understanding is grounded in the next but with no
domain being dispensable and where the emphasis is on unifying,
integrating or synthesizing aspects of knowledge.
CONCLUSION
Usage-based theories of representation see language as a complex
adaptive system; the interaction between cognition and use. Find-
ings from language acquisition research, typology, and psycholin-
guistics are converging on the idea that language representations
are fundamentally built out of use and generalizations over those
usage events. Interestingly, none of the fundamental mechanisms
of the usage-based approach are required to be a language-specific
adaptation. Language shows creativity, categories, and recursion
because people think creatively, categorically, and recursively. Here
we have also drawn special attention to a set of culturally gener-
ated structural patterns that seem to lie beyond the explanation of
the core usage-based cognitive processes. As well as addressing the
need for greater clarity on the mechanisms of generalizations and
the fundamental units of grammar, we suggest one of the next big
challenges for usage-based theory will be unify the anthropological
linguistic data with usage-based cognition.
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